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RECLASSIFICATION 6/10/77
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SOME POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT COURSES OF ACTION AND COUNTER-ACTION

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1. Imposition of the blockade itself does not of course dispose of the problem of offensive weapons already in Cuba. It only embarks us on what is likely to be a long course of action and counter-action between the Soviets and Cubans on the one side and ourselves and our allies on the other. It is impossible to foresee with any certainty what some of the more likely sequences of events may be and how they may be used to accomplish our ultimate aim of eliminating these offensive weapons from Cuba.

2. The Soviets would certainly initiate a full propaganda and political attack in all fora. They would emphasize the underdog situation of Cuba, justness of Castro's cause, threats by U. S. to his survival, defensiveness and legitimacy of weapons for his defense, etc.

3. In the United Nations they would seek to get our action declared illegal, get the neutrals to propose resolutions calling for a lifting of the blockade coupled with elimination of all foreign bases.

4. They would bring pressure on all neutrals to commit themselves to the Soviet side on the issues raised. They would call for "progressive forces" to protest and take political or subversive action against governments not supporting their side.

5. From the broad standpoint, the Soviet Union would be at a serious military disadvantage in attempting to break the blockade by

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military means in the Cuban area. They could threaten dire action, possibly by the missiles located in Cuba, against the United States, if the blockade were not lifted and Cuban sovereignty not fully respected. In any event, the Soviets would seek to have us "fire the first shot" against a Soviet merchant vessel and/or warship in the Cuban area in order to provide a better basis for strong Soviet counter-action in another area. We must face the fact that we may therefore be required to "fire the first shot".

6. This could lay a basis for action in Berlin. One option might be slow action, following a Peace Treaty, with maximum pressure on our allies. Another option could be prompt denial of U. S. military access, justifying their firing on our planes in the Berlin corridor or convoys by reference to our prior action in enforcing the Cuban blockade.

7. They could call for high level discussions of a proposal for the elimination of all foreign bases.

8. Cuban motives will be mixed. On the one hand, if the blockade includes only offensive weapons it will have no economic effects on Cuba, and Castro's self-interest would appear to dictate that he not take actions which would provide a base for us to raise the level of the blockade or take military action directly against Cuba. This factor would militate against his attacking Guantanamo or other actions such as attacking the U. S. blockade force or taking reprisals against

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U. S. merchant vessels and/or ports, in the hope that Soviet counter-actions elsewhere would force us to lift the blockade. He will of course do his maximum to obtain Soviet threats to deter the U. S. from further action.

9. Barring unforeseen and unlikely favorable events in Cuba or in the attitude of Castro, we could within the limits imposed by Soviet-Cuban counter-actions, seek to direct our course toward providing as quickly as possible a basis for direct military action against Cuba, or toward a course of negotiation in which it is likely that we would have to be prepared to pay a price elsewhere to obtain removal of the offensive weapons in Cuba. These courses are of course not mutually exclusive and the choice is by no means only up to us.

10. The former course would require that we take advantage of the opportunities the Soviets and Cubans give us to step up the blockade and to take military actions directed against Cuba without regard to whatever threats the Soviets may make.

11. The course of negotiation can also not be predicted or planned with any high degree of certitude. However, a possible line of action and counter-action could be:

- a. Soviet blockade of Berlin or of U. S. forces in Berlin.
- b. Full U. S. blockade of Cuba.

c. Imposition

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c. Imposition of NATO economic embargo against the Soviet Union.

d. A summit conference or other negotiations in which agreement might be reached on the basis of U. S. withdrawal from Guantanamo and lifting of NATO economic embargo against the Soviet Union in exchange for Soviet withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba and lifting of Berlin blockade. However, this may be very difficult and there is no certainty it could be accomplished without further concessions on our part. Such concessions might relate to the Jupiters in Turkey and an agreement on the installation of long-range missiles at other locations near the Soviet border. (This would present little difficulty except from the political standpoint with respect to Turkey.)

e. It is probable, however, that the Soviets, having completed their installations in Cuba while negotiations drag on, will have more ambitious targets for negotiations than merely Cuba and probably more than Berlin. These broader targets probably include the withdrawal of all foreign bases, the dismantling of military alliances, and possibly other elements of their proposal for general and complete disarmament without inspection until the final phase.

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REVIEWED BY *Bob Blawie Jr.*

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c. Imposition


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